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Introduction: Describing a Difficult Situation
Iran today finds itself in one of the most complex and challenging periods in its modern history. A collection of simultaneous crises in the areas of foreign policy, economy, security, environment, and social cohesion has placed the country in a situation where decision-making is both more necessary and costlier than ever before. This situation is not the result of a single factor, but rather the outcome of an accumulation of decisions, errors, external pressures, and structural changes in the international system. Ignoring this reality or reducing it to “foreign conspiracy” or “internal managerial problems” is a simplification of the issue and a costly cognitive error. What we face today is a structural situation; a situation that requires serious rethinking of approaches.
The year 2025 can be considered the point of crystallization of many of the trends described in this note. Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 and the revival of the “maximum pressure” (1) policy in an intensified form have made the prospects for nuclear diplomacy even darker. At the same time, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria (December 2024) and the consolidation of its consequences in the first months of 2025 dealt a heavy blow to Iran’s regional influence corridor and severely weakened the position of the regional network of allies. Furthermore, the military intervention by Israel and the United States, while demonstrating national cohesion and the country’s defensive capabilities against foreign aggression, simultaneously led to the creation of a state of suspension – neither war nor peace – which naturally leads to the erosion of economic capacity and national cohesion. The continuation of military threats from Israel and the US and the intensification of secondary sanctions on Iran’s oil exports to China (2) have collectively reinforced the image of Iran not as a potential economic partner, but as a “high-risk security actor.” These developments make the need to rethink approaches clearer than ever before.
Iran’s Exit from the Global Interdependence Cycle
Iran’s withdrawal from the cycle of interdependence with major global powers has gradually occurred over more than a decade due to its nuclear issue and the continuation of heavy and escalating economic sanctions. In a world where economy, politics, and security are deeply intertwined, “interdependence ” (3) is not a weakness, but one of the most important sources of power. A country that is needed by others for oil, markets, transit routes, or its stability imposes a high cost on other actors to exclude it. Iran today has largely lost this advantage.
Iran’s lack of a significant presence in the active and official global energy market no longer creates a decisive shock. The global economy, despite all its fluctuations, has adapted to the absence of Iran. Iran’s share of global trade and value chains has decreased so significantly (4) that its removal from the global economy is rarely felt by any significant actor. This bitter reality is one of the most important consequences of the US sanctions strategy and, simultaneously, Iran’s failure to permanently neutralize them.
Regardless of the direction that the new global order and new power relations between the East, West, and the Global South will take, if Iran enters the new world with its current parameters (World Bank and IMF statistics (5) , which compare the latest economic and government budget status of the Islamic Republic of Iran with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Iraq, clearly demonstrate Iran’s current economic situation compared to other countries, especially those in the region), its role and position in the economic geography, technology geography, and consequently political and security geography as an effective player in the process of shaping regional and global power balances will be severely weakened and lack impact.
The Involuntary Transition from Political-Economic Actor to Political-Security Actor
Withdrawal from the cycle of interdependence has a natural consequence: a change in the nature of the country’s role in the international system. Iran has unwillingly transformed from a “political-economic actor” into a “political-security actor.” When a country’s economic, commercial, and diplomatic tools are weakened, it resorts to security tools to maintain its position and influence. This is not necessarily a conscious choice, but rather a structural reaction to the limitation of other options.
In such a situation, Iran has been forced to use the leverage of “threat” or “security assurance” to express itself appropriately in the region and preserve its historical and geopolitical standing. Regional presence, a deterrence network, and playing a role in security equations have become tools to compensate for the imposed reduction in Iran’s political-economic role. While this approach may create deterrence in the short term, it comes with heavy costs for the country and the region in the long term.
Escalation of the Securitization Cycle
Simultaneously, repeated military threats from the US and Israel against Iran have made the country both more determined and more compelled to pursue a security-focused approach. The logic of the “securitization cycle” operates clearly here: the more threats there are, the more security-minded Iran becomes; and the more security-minded Iran acts, the stronger its image as a threatening actor is reinforced. The result is a cycle that is difficult and costly for all parties to break.
However, it must be stated candidly: this trend benefits no one. Not Iran, which sees its development resources depleted; not the region, which remains on the verge of permanent instability; and not major powers like the US and even China, which consider the stability of the Middle East essential for their long-term interests.
The Necessity of Mutual Reconsideration by Iran and the US
The primary actors creating this situation, Iran and the US, are compelled to reconsider their policies towards each other by accepting realities. This reconsideration is not out of ignoring the root causes of the disagreements, but out of necessity for rationality and cost-benefit analysis.
From Iran’s perspective, the first step is to accept “the destructive and decisive impact of US, European, and United Nations sanctions on Iran’s economy,” whether or not the US is in decline. The sanctions have not only disrupted the country’s development process but have also fueled the formation of mega-crises in the economic, energy, environmental, and ultimately political spheres; denying this reality or reducing it to “internal management problems” is not a solution.
The experience of the economic, social, political, and psychological space in the years after the JCPOA and before the US withdrawal from the agreement showed that even the hope of lifting the shadow of sanctions from the country can have profound positive effects on people’s lives and facilitate governance. China’s President’s visit to Iran immediately after the implementation of the JCPOA (6) made this reality clear: the development of economic relations with the East is, at least in the current global power equations, largely contingent on the lifting of Western sanctions. Therefore, lifting sanctions must become the top priority of the country’s policymaking approach, not just a secondary or tactical goal.
In this regard, the Iranian policymaker should not allow the project of “securitization” in Iran to be strengthened and completed as a basis for the approval and continuation of sanctions – which has been managed for years by Israel and especially Netanyahu – with the project of “security-seeking” by domestic currents: there is a difference between “demonstrating power as a deterrent” and “ill-considered actions as an inciting factor and indirect assistance to an Iran-fearing faction.”
The Issue of the Chapter Seven and Damage to Political Independence
It must be accepted that being subject to Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, even in the current circumstances where the return of international sanctions is contested under the so-called Snapback mechanism by the permanent members of the Security Council, seriously undermines Iran’s decision-making independence and political maneuverability. A country in such a position is inevitably forced to adopt positions that are far removed from the concept of “dignity” and independent action when facing powers with veto power in the UN Security Council. Therefore, removing the country from this situation is not a concession, but a strategic necessity.
Social Capital: The Missing Link
In the meantime, special attention must be paid to one point: no strategy for Iran to exit this situation will succeed without restoring domestic social capital. Foreign policy, no matter how intelligently designed, lacks sustainability without the support, consent, and participation of the people. A society that feels injustice, voiceless-ness, and hopelessness cannot be the backbone of a major change in foreign policy. Therefore, alongside a change in approach to foreign policy, extensive, deep, and immediate corrective actions in the country’s political and economic spheres are necessary. Showy or minimal reforms do not build trust or reproduce social capital.
America’s Responsibility in Changing Course
On the other hand, the US must recognize a strong and unified Iran as an undeniable reality. Efforts to weaken or eliminate Iran from regional equations will not only help stability in the Middle East, but will also have unpredictable consequences. The history of this region is full of examples where power vacuums have led to chronic instability.
The US must understand that the Iranian people, regardless of the form and nature of governance, are a people who value dignity and avoid imposition. The simplest idea is to imagine that economic pressure, domestic dissatisfaction, or political differences will lead the Iranian people to welcome a military attack or foreign intervention. Such a notion is not only erroneous, but dangerous.
The Necessity of Serious and Phased Dialogue
Opening the door to serious, purposeful, and phased dialogue between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States is an urgent necessity. These dialogues must have a clear, transparent, and verifiable agenda. America’s interests also lie in acting in such a way that negotiation is not transformed into a tool of attrition this time. Lost trust can only be rebuilt through predictable behavior and practical adherence to commitments. Unfortunately, one of the serious obstacles in the way of establishing a constructive negotiation process with the US is that the US under Trump’s leadership, by discarding all previous slogans and claimed values and displaying relentless self-interest, has eroded trust even with its long-standing allies, let alone Iran.
The pertinent question now is whether the art of diplomacy is not to define opportunities for Iran in its relationship with the US amidst the chaos that Trump has unleashed with unpredictability and the “America First ” (7) policy on the global stage, and even in relation to its European allies?
In a Nutshell: Changing Iran’s Image in the International System
It is time to change the image of Iran, presented as purely a security actor and a troublemaker, to that of a powerful but “peace-maker” by defeating the “security-oriented” project abroad and the “security-seeking” approach domestically. This change in image is possible not through propaganda, but through real changes in behavior and approaches in both Iran and the US. This will only be achieved if both Iran and the US acknowledge existing realities.
Especially Iran, instead of focusing on the costs of its current approach, should focus on the benefits that are still being lost with the continuation of the current approach. This is not a call for surrender or justification of confrontation; rather, it is a call for realistic idealism, focusing on ideals while considering realities, calculating costs, and finding a less costly path to a more sustainable future.
Therefore, the following solutions are worth examining seriously with a realistic idealism:
1. Direct, purposeful, and agenda-driven negotiations with the US, which, in addition to being based on internal power factors (national cohesion and support, economic resilience, military and defensive authority, and genuine and comprehensive governmental will), should be accompanied by initiative and flexibility. Today, one of the most important components of a country’s power in the international arena is having the ability to choose diverse partners.
2. The country’s executive and promotional policies, with a smart blend of the ideals of the Islamic Revolution with the country’s current policies, should symbolize the integration of ideals and reality. It is obvious that in any case, a country’s formulated and official policies are based on realities. One of the undeniable realities is the preference for ensuring the satisfaction of the people over any other approach.
3. The issue of Palestine in the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy should be moved from a specific position and exclusive duty to a human and Islamic issue, pursued and policy mated within the framework of cooperation with the international community, especially Islamic countries and institutions such as the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Non-Aligned Movement. The global community’s reaction to Israel’s crimes in Gaza and the International Criminal Court’s indictment of Netanyahu showed that supporting Palestine on a global scale is much more effective and less costly than defining an exclusive duty for one country.
4. In negotiations with the West and the US, initiatives to create a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, the main condition for which is the disarmament of Israel’s nuclear arsenal, can garner the support of regional and Islamic countries and isolate Israel further.
5. In security and economic agreements with regional countries, provisions such as commitments to protect each other’s energy facilities and infrastructure can be included.
6. It is essential to note that the main function of the resistance approach is to put pressure on the other party and make them regret the continuation of sanctions. However, if the resistance approach, instead of pressuring the US, creates pressure on the people through the development of poverty and injustice, such a function of resistance is a violation of purpose, and the more protracted this resistance becomes, the weaker the country’s position in the sanctions lifting negotiation table will be. No power will be generous in granting concessions to a country suffering from an economic crisis and public dissatisfaction from within.
Postscript:
Between the writing date of this note (December 25th) and its publication, significant developments occurred both domestically and internationally. The protests and unrest within the country, which for the first time resulted in the US President’s support accompanied by military threats, as well as the US military action against Venezuela leading to the abduction of Nicolás Maduro and his transfer to the US. These events, along with the reluctance or inability of powers like China to confront the US President’s norm-breaking behavior, confirm the aforementioned recommendations in this note, because the realm of politics is the realm of possibilities, not desires. Diplomacy remains the only way for the country to exit crises in a low-cost manner.
1. Maximum Pressure Campaign 2.0
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/11/19/get-ready-for-maximum-pressure-20-on-iran
2. https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/iran-sanctions
3. Interdependence
4. https://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/364/index.html
https://ecor.modares.ac.ir/article_13535_106dcf42d88466444a4f5c6455c4d2ee.pdf?lang=en
Torki, L., & Mazaheri, B. (2022). Economic Impact of Financial Sanctions on Iran’s Economy. Economic Research and Perspectives, 22(4), 69-98.
5.https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=SA-TR-IR-IQ
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS?locations=IR-IQ-TR-SA&view=chart
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/exp@FPP/IRN/IRQ/TUR/SAU
6.The visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Tehran on January 23, 2016 (Bahman 3, 1394) took place just one week after the implementation of the JCPOA.
7.America First