Introduction
The 2026 U.S./Israeli military campaign against Iran cannot be merely seen as an attempt to punish an actor for pursuing a nuclear program, but rather as one piece of a larger puzzle in a changing regional and global order that is still unfolding. Since October 7, 2023, when Hamas forces stormed through Israeli lines, took hostages, and launched an unprecedented attack on Israel, the region has undergone a series of profound geopolitical transformations. In response, Israel launched a full-scale bombardment and invasion of the Gaza Strip, resulting in the displacement of millions, the deaths of thousands, and the assassination of not only Hamas leaders but also regional figures such as Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah.
The consequences of the October 7 attacks also contributed to broader regional geopolitical shifts, including the ouster of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the end of the 55-year rule of the Syrian Ba’ath Party. In 2025 and 2026, the United States and Israel launched military campaigns against Iran’s military, security, and civilian infrastructure amid perceptions – and, arguably, misperceptions – of Iran’s weakened regional position. The war against Iran has affected regional actors such as India and Pakistan, both of which maintain important relationships with Tehran, Washington, and Tel Aviv. As a result, the strategic calculus of both New Delhi and Islamabad has been significantly reshaped.
In order to understand these evolving dynamics, the conflict must be examined through several dimensions. One important dimension that deserves further analysis is the extent to which the Iran War can be understood as part of a broader United States strategy to contain Iran and, at greater length, China and Russia, while simultaneously reshaping the balance of power in the Middle East.
Pre-War Regional Dynamics
Before the wars of 2025 (the 12-Day War) and 2026 (the 40-Day War), both Pakistan and India walked a tightrope in managing their relations with Iran and other regional actors, such as the GCC (Persian Gulf Cooperation Council countries of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Oman) and Israel. This balancing act can perhaps be seen more clearly in the case of India, whose foreign policy sought to maintain strategic partnerships with competing regional powers. On the other hand, Pakistan enjoyed – and continues to maintain – cordial relations with Iran. Another dimension of Pakistan’s regional posture is its recent defense cooperation agreements Turkey and with Saudi Arabia, a regional rival and competitor of Iran that, despite normalizing relations with Tehran, continues to experience the strategic fallout of the war due to its close relationship with the United States.
Before the outbreak of the wars – which can arguably be understood as an overspill of tensions that had been mounting periodically since 2019 – the United States and Iran remained locked in a recurring cycle of pressure, confrontation, ceasefires, and negotiations. This regional dilemma appears to have significantly influenced the strategic calculations of both India and Pakistan, compelling each to balance competing security, economic, and diplomatic interests while navigating an increasingly polarized regional environment. The impact of the war has provided opportunities as well as constraints for both India and Pakistan. One of the greatest opportunities has been for Pakistan which has allowed it to rise as a regional mediator as well as a net security provider in the region. Opposite to that India has also cultivated relations with the Taliban, a government currently at odds with Islamabad while also bearing the toll of Israel and the US’s campaign against Tehran.
The ‘I’ in the India–China–Pakistan Triangle
India, the fourth-largest economy in the world, which is widely predicted to attain the status of the third-largest economy within the next several years, has expanded its economic footprint across the Middle East/West Asia through the establishment of a presence in key ports and the promotion of transnational connectivity corridors such as the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) with the GCC countries and Israel, ultimately linking to European markets. This initiative can be viewed as complementary to Washington’s support for the Abraham Accords and the broader normalization of relations between Israel and several Arab states. Recently, according to the 2025 US National Security Memorandum of the second Trump administration, India’s position has been elevated to the status of a strategic partner welcomed by the US by joining the world economy. Recent US-India strategic cultivation has given India a special status in to some manner by becoming a partner to the US in containing China. Despite this closeness of ties, India has also taken pride in following in what it calls “Strategic Autonomy” and practice of “equi-distancing” by forming relations with others which are seen as adversaries by the US.
Parallel to this, India has cultivated relations with Iran, Russia, and Azerbaijan for the development of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), while simultaneously cooperating with Iran and Afghanistan on the development of the Chabahar Port. At the same time, India finds itself in strategic rivalry and competition with both China and Pakistan. As India has expanded its economic influence and strategic footprint across West Asia and other regions such as Africa, China has also significantly increased its regional presence. Since 2013, through the expansion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is estimated to have invested over one trillion U.S. dollars cumulatively in maritime and land infrastructure projects stretching from East Asia to the Middle East and Africa. China has also spearheaded multilateral organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS, both of which include India and Iran as members, creating an arena in which strategic competition and multilateral cooperation coexist.
China’s close strategic relationship with Pakistan through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) arguably places India in a geostrategic bind, prompting New Delhi to invest in ports and strategic infrastructure in countries such as Sri Lanka, Oman, Iran, and Mongolia. This strategy has frequently been described as the “Necklace of Diamonds,” serving as a counterweight to China’s so-called “String of Pearls,” which is often perceived in India as an attempt at geostrategic encirclement.
Beyond their geostrategic competition, India, China, and Pakistan also constitute a nuclear triangle whose dynamics have periodically brought the region to moments of heightened tension, most notably during the crises of 1999 and 2025, both of which prompted varying degrees of U.S. diplomatic engagement and mediation between India and Pakistan.
Since 2023, political changes in Bangladesh and the Maldives have arguably generated unease in New Delhi, with sections of the Indian strategic community viewing these developments with suspicion and, at times, attributing increased influence to Islamabad and Beijing. Conversely, the case of Nepal’s former government, which was widely viewed as maintaining close relations with China, could be interpreted from Beijing’s perspective as reflecting legitimate regional engagement rather than geopolitical competition. These developments can be understood as manifestations of the broader and recurring Sino-Indian rivalry, which has periodically intensified over both political and security issues.
Other manifestations of this rivalry can be observed in the long-standing border disputes stretching from the western sectors near Xinjiang to the eastern approaches around the Siliguri Corridor, as well as in India’s restrictions on numerous Chinese digital applications. It is also worth noting that, despite the cyclical pattern of tension and détente between the two Asian powers, China has remained a notable – albeit relatively limited – source of foreign direct investment in India. This enduring competition between China and India over geostrategic space, regional influence, and connectivity initiatives has arguably encouraged India to deepen its strategic partnership with the United States, thereby placing New Delhi in a unique position within the evolving global order.
U.S.–India
Since Narendra Modi assumed office as Prime Minister in 2014, India has continued to cultivate closer relations with Washington, resulting in the signing of several strategic partnership and defense agreements that have further institutionalized bilateral cooperation. Agreements such as the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) have significantly expanded defense coordination, interoperability, and intelligence sharing between the two countries. Prior to this since 2005, India has joined the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue(QUAD) the US along with Japan and Phillipines parallel to other US led Indo-Pacific treaties such as AUKUS and ANZUS (jointly with Australia and New Zealand) in containing China. Most recently India and the US have signed a 10 – year defense agreement in which New Delhi which would allow for it to balance its relations with countries such as China and Iran while simultaneously receiving security guarantees from the US in case of any aggressive attack from any invasive actor.
Although the United States and India appear to have developed an increasingly comprehensive strategic partnership, one issue continues to test not only the bilateral relationship but also India’s long-standing policies of “multi-alignment”, “strategic autonomy”, “strategic hedging” and the Chabahar Port project. In this regard, Chabahar arguably represents one of the clearest examples of the tension between India’s expanding strategic partnership with the United States and its enduring geopolitical and economic interests in Iran.
Iran–India
Since the 1990’s, Iran and India have expanded ties which have allowed both countries to develop mutual joint projects which both provide economic opportunities as well as geostrategic sphere which is beneficial to Iran and India developing a strategic cooperative relationship. Projects such as the INSTC and Chabahar allow for India to circumvent Pakistan as well as China in accessing Central Asian markets through Afghanistan also allows Iran to expand its regional influence by also developing ties with such states. Despite this burgeoning relationship, several geopolitical factors impact the relationship such as the United States.
Between 2005 and 2009, India, partly in an effort to accommodate Washington’s concerns as part of the growing détente with Washington at the time, withdrew from the IPI (Iran–Pakistan–India) pipeline project, also known as the “Peace Pipeline.” This period also witnessed disagreements between New Delhi and Tehran over India’s votes regarding Iran’s nuclear program at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Following the election of Mr. Hassan Rouhani as President in 2013, Iran entered multilateral negotiations with France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the European Union, China, Russia, and the United States regarding its nuclear program, which eventually resulted in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Following the signing of the JCPOA, India signed an agreement with Iran and Afghanistan for the development of the Chabahar Port. However, the project has since operated under several challenges, including the return of the Taliban in 2021, periodic U.S. sanctions exemptions, and the broader consequences of the 2025–2026 U.S./Israeli–Iran War India during this period has had to not only balance between China and the US but also between Iran, the US and Israel as well.
Indo–Pakistan War 2025
On April 22, 2025, several individuals associated with a Pakistani-backed extremist militia, according to Indian claims, attacked a tourist resort in Jammu, resulting in the deaths of dozens of people. In response, India suspended trade relations with Pakistan, halted the Indus Waters Treaty, and launched “Operation Sindoor” against military targets in Pakistan. The crisis represented the latest major confrontation between India and Pakistan driven by the longstanding Kashmir dispute.
Lasting four days, the conflict ended following U.S. intervention, according to U.S. President Donald Trump. The crisis occurred during Trump’s return to office as the 47th President of the United States and amid the administration’s broader trade disputes, which resulted in significant tariff pressures on both India and Pakistan. This development can be interpreted as an example of the increasingly complex relationship between Washington and New Delhi.
Amid these growing tensions, reports suggest that India has expanded engagement with the Taliban government in Afghanistan, particularly as relations between the Afghan Emirate and Pakistan have deteriorated. Additionally, some claims have linked India’s potential engagement with the Baloch insurgent movement, the BLA, to broader strategic calculations regarding Pakistan. These developments reflect the possibility that regional rivalries between India and Pakistan may continue to influence the strategic environment of South Asia. Such as event between the two arch-rivals coupled with the Iran war has allowed for the South Asian actors to seek new avenues of opportunities as well as the buying of risk of crises of the Middle East which seem to have overlapped with that of South Asia. Opportunities in which Pakistan has been able to take advantage of as well as the risk that any future conflict may reignite the conflict between India and Pakistan.
U.S.–Pakistan Reset
Since 2022, Washington has pursued a reset in relations with Pakistan under the government of Shehbaz Sharif, alongside the rise of former ISI Director and Army Chief Asim Munir to the position of Field Marshall of the Pakistan Army. Pakistan has been able to secure lower tariffs from the United States, while also opening opportunities for U.S. firms to invest in areas such as rare earth elements and offshore oil extraction. These developments come at a time when Pakistan continues to face multiple challenges, including domestic opposition toward the Sharif–Munir civil-military arrangement and a persistent international debt crisis.
The U.S./Israel War on Iran
Since the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, U.S.–Iran relations have been defined by confrontation, limited engagement, and periodic diplomatic openings Since the election of Donald Trump and his withdrawal from the JCPOA and the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, US-Iran relations has been marked by US campaign of maximum pressure, military buildup in the Persian Gulf region and the threat of regime change though military action.
With the election of Joe Biden (2021-2025) the desire to return of pre-Trump normalcy under the guise of the JCPOA was initiated. During the Biden Administration, efforts to revive the JCPOA failed amid regional pressures, Israeli opposition, the consequences of the Russia–Ukraine War, and the geopolitical impact of the October 7 attacks. With the return of Trump in 2025, the campaign for “regime change” or “behavioral change” was mounted by the US.
These developments further solidified the strategic divide between Iran and the United States–Israel alliance, creating the conditions for the later escalation toward direct military confrontation.
12-Day War
In April 2024, Israel launched a strike against the Iranian consulate in Damascus, killing IRGC Commander Mohammad Reza Zahedi. The attack resulted in Iran launching “Operation True Promise I” against Israel, during which Iran fired ballistic missiles and drones toward Israeli targets. Later that year, following the helicopter crash that resulted in the death of Mr. Ebrahim Raisi and the election of Mr. Masoud Pezeshkian, Israel carried out an operation that killed Ismail Haniyeh, one of Hamas’ senior leaders, while he was in Tehran attending the inauguration ceremony of Iran’s newly elected president.
In August of the same year, Israel also targeted Hassan Nasrallah and other senior figures within Hezbollah, prompting Iran to launch “Operation True Promise II” on a significantly larger scale. This escalation was followed by a limited Israeli strike against Tehran, occurring alongside the collapse of the Assad government in Syria and the rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa (Jolani), a former figure associated with extremist networks, as Syria’s new political authority.
Following this period, extending into the spring of 2025, the United States and Iran entered direct negotiations that were initially perceived as an opportunity for reducing tensions. However, in June 2025, Israel launched what it described as “Operation Rising Lion,” targeting senior Iranian military leadership, including Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, Hossein Salami, Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, and other senior military officials.
During the conflict, which became known as the 12-Day War, Iran launched extensive missile attacks against Israel. The United States subsequently entered the conflict through “Operation Midnight Hammer,” targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, including Fordow and Natanz. On the twelfth day of the conflict, a ceasefire was announced by U.S. President Donald Trump through Truth Social.
40-Day War
Between June 2025 and March 2026, attempts at renewed negotiations and U.S.–Iran rapprochement remained under pressure. In March 2026, the United States and Israel launched a military operation targeting southern Iran and Tehran, resulting in terror of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei. Within hours, Iran responded with a large-scale missile campaign targeting Israel, Jordan, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, transforming the conflict into a broader regional confrontation.
Two developments can be identified as contributing factors to the eventual end of the war in an attritional stalemate. First, Iran’s strike against facilities near Dimona represented a significant escalation and can be viewed as a factor influencing U.S. decision-making, including President Trump’s statement that “a whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again.” Second, Iran’s decision to close the Strait of Hormuz represented a major strategic move due to the waterway’s importance for global energy and trade flows, with a significant portion of global oil, gas, and commercial shipping passing through the area.
The Durand Fault Line: The Case for Pakistani Conflict Mediation
Since the colonial period, the Durand Line has remained a major point of contention and a recurring security flashpoint between modern-day Afghanistan and Pakistan, with broader implications for regional actors such as India. The border divides communities, particularly among Pashtun and Baloch populations, and has historically served as an arena for political competition, insurgency, and cross-border tensions.
Since the Soviet–Afghan War and subsequent conflicts, the border region has frequently been viewed by both Pakistan and Afghanistan through the lens of strategic depth and security competition. Following the announcement of another ceasefire by U.S. President Donald Trump, Pakistan emerged as a key mediator between the United States and Iran. This development potentially elevated Pakistan’s role as a regional diplomatic actor alongside its strategic defense partnership with Riyadh. Pakistan’s mediation efforts can be interpreted as an attempt to strengthen its regional position, balance relations between Tehran and Riyadh, and insulate itself from potential future security challenges, while also addressing longstanding tensions along the Durand Line, where previous mediation efforts by actors such as Qatar and Turkey had produced limited outcomes.
The Seas of Troubles
Another front that has emerged against Israel and Saudi Arabia involves the Houthis of Yemen, who have acted in support of Iran and have disrupted maritime activity in the Arabian Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Red Sea. This development has generated concerns not only for the United States, which maintains a significant naval presence and frequently monitors these strategic waterways, but also for India due to its dependence on maritime trade routes and regional connectivity.
In 2023, an attack on the MV Chem Pluto prompted a strong reaction from India, with the Indian government increasing maritime surveillance and deploying additional naval assets, including drones, guided missile systems, and other military hardware to monitor critical sea lines of communication. These developments demonstrate how conflicts in the Middle East can increasingly influence the strategic calculations of South Asian actors beyond their immediate geographic boundaries.
Conclusion: Post-War Dilemmas
In the aftermath of the conflict, one can argue that the war, which ended in an unstable stalemate while periodically producing renewed attacks among multiple actors, reflects a broader geopolitical struggle involving the United States, China, and Russia. From this perspective, the conflict can be interpreted as part of Washington’s broader strategy to contain Russian and Chinese influence while reshaping the regional balance of power.
This argument can be supported from several perspectives. The perception that Iran had weakened its regional position following developments in Syria created an opportunity to increase pressure on Iranian-aligned groups in Iraq and Syria, while simultaneously applying military and diplomatic pressure on Tehran to pursue structural and behavioral changes within Iran’s leadership. Israel, however, appeared to pursue a more ambitious objective centered on regime change in Iran, an outcome that remains uncertain.
Beyond the immediate consequences for Iran, the war has significantly affected both India and Pakistan. In India’s case, the disruption of energy markets and rising petroleum prices created economic pressures that required government intervention across several sectors. These developments also complicated India’s economic trajectory and raised questions regarding its strategic autonomy. The conflict further forced New Delhi to reconsider the future of the Chabahar Port project, potentially affecting one of India’s important strategic investments and its ability to maintain diplomatic flexibility between Washington and Tehran.
Pakistan similarly faces concerns that a prolonged conflict could expand regional instability, allowing Middle Eastern conflicts to overlap with existing South Asian rivalries. Islamabad must continue balancing its relations with Tehran, Washington, and Tel Aviv while also considering the possibility of renewed tensions with India and the potential for another South Asian military confrontation.
Ultimately, the Iran War has demonstrated the interconnected nature of contemporary geopolitics, where conflicts in one region can reshape the strategic calculations of actors far beyond the immediate battlefield. For both India and Pakistan, the conflict represents not only a security challenge but also a test of diplomatic balancing, economic resilience, and regional positioning in an increasingly contested international order.
*The views and opinions expressed in articles published in this section are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the official positions or views of PAIAB.